Why Do Car-Carrier Fires Go Without a Report?

Because the duty to investigate falls on the flag state and nothing sets a deadline for the report. IMO's Casualty Investigation Code, mandatory since 1 January 2010, requires a safety investigation into every very serious casualty and a final report to IMO, but no date. Panama investigated the 2018 Sincerity Ace fire and has not released a report. Across shipping, 204 of 526 very serious casualties in 2017–2020 produced no report at IMO.

That gap matters more for car carriers than for most ship types. Their fires are rare, costly and hard to explain, and the hull often sinks before anyone can examine it. An investigation report is the one public document that can say what started a fire, what the crew saw and which defence failed. Without it, owners, insurers and regulators are left arguing from press reports and court files.

Who has to investigate a car-carrier fire?

The flag state, unless it agrees otherwise with another affected state. The Casualty Investigation Code, adopted by Resolution MSC.255(84) on 16 May 2008 and made mandatory through SOLAS regulation XI-1/6, defines a very serious marine casualty as one involving the total loss of the ship, a death or severe damage to the environment. Chapter 6 says a safety investigation must be conducted into every one, and that the flag state is responsible for making sure it is carried out and completed.

Other states can take part or take the lead. The Code lists "substantially interested" states: the coastal state, any state whose environment or nationals were harmed, and any state holding important information. Where a casualty happens in a state's territorial sea, the flag and coastal states must consult on who leads. On the high seas or in an exclusive economic zone, consultation is required where more than one flag state is involved. In practice, the reports that do appear on car-carrier fires often come from a coastal state's investigator, not the flag's.

What the Code requires, and what it doesn't

It requires a report but not a date. Chapter 14 says the investigating state shall submit the final report on every very serious casualty to IMO, and make it available to the public and the shipping industry. There is no deadline in the mandatory text and no sanction for a report that never comes. The European Union goes further for its own members: Directive 2009/18/EC requires member states' investigation bodies to publish a report within 12 months of a casualty, or an interim report if the final one is not ready.

What the car-carrier record looks like

Reports come mostly from strong coastal investigators; fires far offshore under open registries often produce none. The pattern in the cases this site has covered:

• Höegh Xiamen (2020, at a Jacksonville berth): the US NTSB published Marine Accident Report MAR-21/04 and named a probable cause.
• Grande America (2019, Bay of Biscay): France's BEAmer investigated and published, though it could not fix where the fire began.
• Euroferry Olympia (2022, off Corfu): Greece's HBMCI led and published an interim report in June 2023.
• Fremantle Highway (2023, off the Dutch coast, Panama flag): the Dutch Safety Board reported in May 2025, on the rescue rather than the cause.
• Sincerity Ace (2018, north Pacific, Panama flag, five crew dead): Panama investigated; no report has been released.
• Felicity Ace (2022, off the Azores, Panama flag) and Morning Midas (2025, north Pacific, Liberia flag): no published investigation report was found for either.

Why the missing reports cost the industry

Because every unexplained fire becomes an argument instead of a lesson. Shipping organisations raised this at IMO in 2014: ICS and the ITF told the Maritime Safety Committee that missing reports frustrated operators trying to learn from casualties. Lloyd's List reported in 2024 that report submission had improved by 12% over four years, but that member states still routinely failed to publish. For car carriers the cost shows up in three places.

First, prevention: the industry is debating whether EVs, used cars or ship systems drive these fires, and each missing report removes a data point. Second, recovery: when nobody can prove which vehicle started a fire, subrogation fails, as the Stuttgart court found in the claim against Porsche over Felicity Ace in May 2026. Third, pricing: underwriters asked to price EV-heavy cargo without causal evidence price the uncertainty instead.

What owners and underwriters can do

Treat the evidence as yours to keep, not the flag state's to publish. Owners can preserve their own records of a casualty, from alarm logs and loading data to CCTV and VDR data where it can be recovered, rather than relying on a report that may never come. When choosing a flag, they can ask how its investigation body handles very serious casualties, and how many of its reports reach IMO. Underwriters and P&I clubs can ask the same questions at renewal and support coastal-state investigations when a casualty happens in their waters. None of this replaces a public report. It narrows how much depends on one.

Sources

• 1. IMO Resolution MSC.255(84), Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code), adopted 16 May 2008 (IMO PDF), read: definitions of substantially interested State (2.20) and very serious marine casualty (2.22); Chapter 6 (investigation of every very serious marine casualty; flag State responsible); Chapter 7 (consultation with coastal and other flag States on the investigating State); Chapter 14 (final report submitted to IMO and made available to the public). Parts I and II made mandatory by SOLAS regulation XI-1/6 from 1 January 2010.
• 2. Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (accident investigation in the maritime transport sector), Article 14: investigation report, including conclusions and recommendations, to be made public within 12 months of the casualty, or an interim report within 12 months if the final report is not ready.
• 3. Lloyd's List — "Casualty reporting falling short of targets" (2021): 526 very serious casualties 2017–2020, 322 reports submitted to IMO GISIS; missing reports led by Indonesia (16), Panama (13) and Hong Kong (11). Lloyd's List — "Flag states are slowly getting better at investigating casualties" (16 July 2024): 12% improvement in reports submitted over four years, 5% improvement in basic quality.
• 4. ITF / ICS joint submission to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, as reported by ITF Seafarers (10 July 2014): concern at the failure of some flag states to submit casualty investigation reports.
• 5. Case outcomes are covered, with their sources, in the linked case studies: Höegh Xiamen (NTSB MAR-21/04); Grande America (BEAmer); Euroferry Olympia (HBMCI interim report, June 2023); Fremantle Highway (Dutch Safety Board, May 2025); Sincerity Ace (Panama Maritime Authority investigation, report not released). Stuttgart ruling on Felicity Ace per the linked subrogation post.