NTSB & USCG Post-Casualty Recommendations
The NTSB's car-carrier recommendations come from Höegh Xiamen and Grande Costa d'Avorio: battery disconnection, restoring detection, and port firefighting.
The US National Transportation Safety Board investigates and recommends; it does not regulate. Its recommendations on vehicle-carrier fires come from two US port casualties, not from Felicity Ace, which sank off the Azores under the Panama flag. Höegh Xiamen burned at Jacksonville in 2020, and Grande Costa d'Avorio at Port Newark in 2023. Between them they produced recommendations on battery disconnection, restoring fire detection after loading, and the readiness of shore firefighters for ship fires.
What did the NTSB find on Höegh Xiamen?
That an improperly disconnected battery in a used vehicle started a fire that destroyed the ship and its 2,420 used vehicles. The NTSB's report, MAR-21/04, found that many vehicles had batteries not disconnected and secured according to procedure, and that detection of the fire was delayed because the ship's fire detection had not been reactivated after loading. It named four safety issues: training for and oversight of battery securement, regulatory exceptions for used and damaged vehicles, fire detection deactivation during loading, and effective emergency distress calls.
It issued seven recommendations: one each to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the US Coast Guard and the National Maritime Safety Association; two to the charterer, Grimaldi Deep Sea; and three to Höegh Technical Management. Those to the operator covered procedures for reactivating fire detection after loading and making emergency contact information immediately available to the bridge team.
What did the NTSB find on Grande Costa d'Avorio?
That a shoreside pusher vehicle caught fire on an interior garage deck during loading at Port Newark on 5 July 2023, and that two land-based firefighters lost in the smoke-filled deck died. The Board found the Newark Fire Division lacked marine firefighting training. The crew could not seal the space for CO2 because the control for a large ramp door was inside the fire zone. Adopted on 15 April 2025, its recommendations went to OSHA, on enforcing powered industrial truck rules at marine terminals; to the Newark Fire Division, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and US fire-service bodies, on marine firefighting training; and to the ship's classification society, to require SOLAS fire doors to be closable from both sides.
Why do these recommendations matter outside the US?
Because the failures they describe are not American. Detection left off after loading, used-vehicle batteries left connected, boundaries that cannot be closed from outside the fire, and port firefighters untrained for ships all occur wherever car carriers load. Insurers, class societies and other administrations read NTSB reports closely, and the same issues now appear in the 2026 FSS Code amendments on detection during loading and in IUMI's best-practice guidance.
- Restore every detection section isolated during loading, by procedure and with a record.
- Verify battery disconnection and securing on used vehicles, and oversee it.
- Check that fire boundaries and CO2 closures can be operated from outside the protected zone.
- Share ship familiarisation with the fire services at every regular load port.
How RoRoSAFE helps
Both NTSB cases turn on detection and response in port. RoRoSAFE gives US-trade and other operators per-vehicle thermal and gas detection that stays on through loading and alerts before visible smoke, and tamper-evident logs that record each alert and the crew's response. It installs alongside the berth without drydock and complements the ship's existing systems.
Pilot: one deck · installed alongside the berth · no drydock · 6 months of dashboard access
Sources
- 1. NTSB Marine Investigation Report MAR-21/04 — 'Fire aboard Roll-on/Roll-off Vehicle Carrier Höegh Xiamen', Jacksonville, Florida, 4 June 2020 (adopted 1 December 2021); NTSB press release 16 December 2021; recommendation letters M-21-014 to -021.
- 2. NTSB Marine Investigation Report MIR-25/16 — 'Fire aboard Roll-on/Roll-off Container Vessel Grande Costa D'Avorio', Port Newark, 5 July 2023; board meeting 15 April 2025; press release 'NTSB Recommends Improving Preparedness of Land-Based Firefighters for Marine Vessel Fires'; recommendation letters M-25-001 to -011.
- 3. US Coast Guard — Report of Investigation into the fire on board Höegh Xiamen.
- 4. IMO Resolution MSC.555(108) — FSS Code amendments on detection during loading; IUMI, 'Risk mitigation for the safe ocean and short-sea carriage of electric vehicles', September 2025.
Questions, answered
Did the NTSB investigate the Felicity Ace fire?+
No. Felicity Ace was a Panama-flagged ship that sank off the Azores in 2022. The NTSB's vehicle-carrier fire recommendations come from two US port casualties: Höegh Xiamen at Jacksonville in 2020 and Grande Costa d'Avorio at Port Newark in 2023.
What caused the Höegh Xiamen fire?+
The NTSB found that an improperly disconnected battery in a used vehicle started it. Many vehicles had batteries that were not disconnected and secured according to procedure, and detection of the fire was delayed because the ship's fire detection had not been reactivated after loading. The ship and 2,420 used vehicles were lost.
What did the NTSB recommend after Grande Costa d'Avorio?+
Better marine firefighting training and familiarity for land-based fire departments, enforcement of powered industrial truck rules at marine terminals, and a class requirement for SOLAS fire doors to be closable from both sides, because the crew could not seal the CO2 zone when the door control was inside it.
Do NTSB recommendations apply to non-US ships?+
They are not binding on anyone, including US operators, but the failures they address occur in every port. Insurers, class societies and administrations read them, and the same issues appear in the 2026 FSS Code amendments on detection during loading and in IUMI's best-practice guidance.
Continue the thread
Höegh Xiamen: The CTL Precedent
A 2020 Jacksonville fire produced a constructive total loss and a ~$26M settlement — and reshaped how car-carrier underwriters price the loading interface.
Can FSS CO₂ Extinguish a Li-Ion Fire?
A Li-ion cell in thermal runaway is self-oxidising. The FSS Code 45% CO2 concentration suppresses conventional fires but cannot extinguish the cell itself.
